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EXPERT AND OTHER OPINION TESTIMONY
MASON LADD*
The improvement of the law m the area of opinion evidence is in
the forefront today, both in respect to testimony in terms of inference
upon the part of lay witnesses and in the use of expert testimony. In
this era of scientific advancement it is reasonable to expect that the
use of expert testimony, where scientific knowledge will aid in the
proper solution of litigated cases, will be much greater in the
future. This trend 'is enhanced by the increasing use of demonstra-
tive evidence. While much evidence classified as real or demonstra-
tive evidence, does not involve the use of opinion testimony, a very
substantial part of it is connected with the opinion of experts and its
usefulness is dependent upon expert testimony. The greater use of
models, charts, diagrams, X-ray films and photographs may serve
well in producing a better understanding of facts involving scientific
matters and enable the expert to demonstrate his opinion upon these
matters much more effectively than by words alone. These effective
devices will have a marked influence upon the methods of 'examining
experts and will tend to reduce the use of the long and complicated
hypothetical question. Chapter VII of the Uniform Rules on opinion
testimony expresses the best of modern thinking upon this subject
and should receive wide acceptance. There is a great deal of varia-
tion in different jurisdictions in respect to opinion testimony, some
rigidly restricting its use almost to the confines of the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries.
Fortunately, Minnesota through judicial decision and by statute
has taken a forward looking position and there will be nothing strange
or novel in the Uniform Rules when they are considered by mem-
bers of the bench and bar of this state. They will give authoritative
sanction to developments which are already taking place and in
many situations will provide but a clear, concise statement of con-
cepts now a part of the law of Minnesota.
As the purpose of this article is to consider the Minnesota law
in comparison with the Uniform Rules, the discussion will be
arranged in the order of the sections and their several divisions
appearing under Chapter VII entitled, Expert and Other Opinion
Testimony.
TESTIMONY IN THE FORM Or OPINION. RULE 56
,During the nineteenth century the exclusion of opinion evidence
from a lay witness was carried beyond reason in this country and
*Dean, The State University of Iowa College of Law.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
even today many courts in their effort to confine a witness to a
statement of fact have precluded a witness from effectively narrating
what he knows.' There is perhaps no more frequent objection given
in court to questions asked to lay witnesses than the objection that
a question calls for the opinion and conclusion of the witness. The
fine line between testimony in terms of opinion and fact is often
difficult to draw and because of this the rule of evidence has been
subject to great abuse.2 Historically it was designed to prevent a
witness from expressing his speculations or persuasions about mat-
ters of which he had no personal knowledge.3 Just as the hearsay
rule precludes a witness from testifying to what he heard others
say, the opinion rule limits testimony to facts rather than what
the witness thought about the facts. The rule developed into a tech-
nical limitation upon the kind of language which a witness would
be permitted to use in expressing facts which he had personally per-
ceived. Nevertheless, it was recognized that many facts could be
related only in terms of opinion, and it became common everywhere
to permit testimony in terms of inference by lay witnesses upon
such subjects as identity, resemblances, color, odor, conduct, feel-
ing and other matters about which it was difficult for a witness
to express himself factually 4
(1) Testimony of Lay Witnesses
Division (1) of Rule 56 seeks to eliminate the refinements in-
volved in determining the distinction between fact and inference or
opinion, it makes basic the requirement that the testimony of a
witness be founded upon personal knowledge. It provides, "If the
witness is not testifying as an expert his testimony in the form of
opinions or inferences is limited to such opinions or inferences as
the judge finds (a) may be rationally based on the perception of the
witness and (b) are helpful to a clear understanding of his testi-
mony or to the determination of the fact in issue." Judicial decision
1. See 7 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 1917-19 (3d ed. 1940) , Ladd, Model
Code of Evidence, 27 Iowa L. Rev. 213, 215-20 (1942), Model Code of
Evidence, Rules 329, 332-39 (1942), Handbook, National Conference of
Judicial Councils 114, 116-20 (1942) in which a resum6 of the history of evi-
dence is presented considering the developments of the nineteenth century.
2. Dean Wigmore states that "It is impossible to confine witnesses
to some fancied realm of 'knowledge' or 'fact' and to forbid them to enter
the domain of 'opinions' or inferences. There are no such contrasted groups of
certain and uncertain testimony, and there never can be." 7 Wigmore, Evi-
dence §§ 1919 at 16 (3d ed. 1940). See also McCormick, Some Observations
upon the Opinion Rule and Expert Testimony, 23 Texas L. Rev. 109-21
(1945), Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 414, 415-17 (1952).
3. 7 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 1917-19 (3d ed. 1940).




in Minnesota, to a considerable extent, has shifted to the new con-
cept permitting testimony to be given in terms of inference or
opinion when facts cannot otherwise be described adequately or
easily. The case of Lestico v. Kuehner involved an action to recover
for personal injuries arising from an automobile accident.5 When
remanding the case for new trial on other grounds, the court made
suggestions in respect to erroneous rulings in which there had been
too great a restriction upon testimony claimed to call for the conclu-
sion of a witness. The trial court excluded a question asking defend-
ant if he had observed where his car had made a sudden turn from
his examination of the tire marks after the accident. The ques-
tion was excluded as calling for a conclusion but on appeal it was
held that the question was proper because it plainly asked for a
fact within the personal observation of the witness. The court
regarded the essence of the question to involve a statement of fact
and pointed out that the problem is to distinguish between the men-
tal process which is a mere 'conclusion and one which represents
an expression of observed facts in terms of inference. The court
stressed the same point presented in division (1) (a) of Uniform
Rule 56 which requires that the statement be based upon the percep-
tion of the witness.
If the testimony is based upon personal perception the opinion
exclusion should be restricted to those cases where testimony in
terms of inference would not be helpful to a clear understanding or
better determination of the issues. The trial court necessarily is
given a wide discretion in the application of the opinion rule.0 The
earlier Minnesota cases were much stricter as is indicated by the
case of Sowers v. Dukes, in which the action of the trial court was
approved in excluding testimony that a certain fence was inadequate
to turn stock because this was not a matter involving science or
skill. 7 Verbal description of the fence would be difficult and testi-
mony that the fence was so broken down that it would not turn or
hold cattle would seem to be proper testimony in terms of inference.
In the case of Hathaway z. Brount the trial court was reversed for
allowing a witness to state that he thought two men could not
have had a certain conversation without his hearing it.8 The court
felt, because the witness had stated the facts and circumstances, that
the expression of the inference was an invasion of the province of
the jury. The language used was but a different way of saying that
5. 204 Minn. 125, 283 N. W. 122 (1938).
6. Greenberg v. Holfeltz, 69 N. W. 2d 369 (Minn. 1955).
7. 8 Minn. 23 (1862).
8. 22 Minn. 214 (1875).
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the men did not make the statements while he was present, which
would have been proper. The jury had the duty of determining
whether the statement had been made and were as free to decide
the issue under either form of expression of the witness. These cases
are representative of the time during which they were decided. Lay
witnesses are permitted to express an opinion that an individual
was drunk although he could have otherwise described his con-
duct, 9 that a blow struck upon a building by the accused before a
quarrel sounded like a blow from a piece of iron'0 and everywhere
a lay witness, after testifying to the observations upon which his
opinion is based, may express an opinion as to the sanity or mental
capacity of a person whom he has observed."' In a multitude of
cases in which the line between fact and inference has been drawn
it is doubted if the triers of fact would have reached a different
evaluation of the testimony, whatever form of communication was
used as long as the witness was testifying from personal perception.
This is the position of the Uniform Rules.
Closely associated with expression of facts in terms of inference
is the statement of the facts as the impression of the witness. Illus-
trative of these expressions are, "I think," "I believe," "my imii-
pression is," "I cannot be positive, but I think," "to the best of
my recollection," or "it is my understanding." The admissibility of
testimony accompanied by such limitations involves the same funda-
mental issue to be considered when permitting the witness to testify
in terms of inference, namely, is the witness speaking from his per-
sonal knowledge or is his testimony only a mental speculation. Not
infrequently such precautionary statements may strengthen the
testimony because they indicate that the witness does not want
to overstate the facts. On the other hand, such statements may
indicate that his recollection is poor which would weaken the testi-
mony but not exclude it. Only when it appears that the witness
has not personally perceived the matter about which he testifies
will the testimony be excluded.' 2
9. State v. Jones, 126 Minn. 45, 147 N. W 822 (1914).
10. State v. Lucy, 41 Minn. 60, 42 N. W 697 (1889).
11. Hartz v. Hoff, 237 Minn. 313, 54 N. W 2d 784 (1952) , Sullivan v.
Brown, 225 Minn. 524, 31 N. W 2d 439 (1948), Cunningham v. Fegan, 219
Minn. 80, 17 N. W 2d 85 (1944).
12. See Lovejoy v. Howe, 55 Minn. 353, 356, 57 N. W 57, 58 (1893)
The requirement of perception of a witness is most frequently considered in
connection with hearsay. A witness is not giving hearsay testimony when he
has observed personally the matters about which he testifies. He is thus able
to be cross-examined to test the accuracy of his testimony and the completeness
of his expression about the things he observed. The same testing process is avail-
able when a witness gives his testimony in terms of inference if the witness
has perceived the matters to which inquiry has been directed. The opportunity
[Vol. 40:437
OPINION TESTIMONY
A difference should be pointed out between the Uniform Rules
and the Model Code of Evidence of the American Law Institute.
The results are much the same and wide discretion is given to the
trial judge. The Model Code Rule 401 accepted testimony of a lay
witness in terms of inference or opinion generally unless the court
excluded it because it was felt that the testimony could be better
stated factually. Uniform Rule 56(1) assumes that the witness will
give his testimony factually but permits him to testify m terms of
opinions or inferences when the court finds that the -witness has
perceived and when it will be more helpful to clear understanding.
The rule is in accord with the judicial trend in the Minnesota cases
and will improve the application of the principles now well recog-
nized.
(2) The Testimony of an Expert
Uniform Rule 56(2) provides that, "If the witness is testifying
as an expert, testimony of the witness in the form of opinions or
inferences is limited to such opinions as the judge finds are (a)
based on facts or data perceived by or personally known or made
known to the witness at the hearing and (b) within the scope of the
special knowledge, skill, experience or training possessed by the
witness."
The Rule assumes that if a witness testifies as an expert
he will be first qualified, otherwise it would not appear that he
possessed the learning required to testify. There is no express pro-
vision for this but if the witness testifies as an expert he must have
the background required under subdivision (b) set out above. Rule
8 under the general provision vests in the court the authority to
determine the qualification of a person to be a witness which
includes an expert witness.
The Rule requires that the expert witness base his testimony
upon facts personally perceived by or known to him or made known
to him at the hearing. This provision takes care of the expert who
is expressing his opinion based upon his personal observations
which would be the situation when a doctor testifies in respect to a
patient under his care, or when an engineer does so in respect to plans
or construction work about which he has personal knowledge. This
phase of the Rule must be considered in connection with Rule 58
by which it is unnecessary for him to specify the data before ex-
to cross-examine eliminates the danger of improper evaluation of testimony
in terms of inference when it is first shown that the witness is testifying as to
matters personally perceived. Rule 19 of the Uniform Rules requires that a




pressing his opinion. On cross-examination he may be required to
specify such data but it is not made a condition for giving expert
testimony This Rule is contrary to the law of many states which
requires the expert to relate the facts upon which his opinion is
founded before he expresses his opinion. Ordinarily an expert would
state observations before expressing his opinion as this would give
weight to the opinion when expressed. Moreover the narration of
factual data by the expert who has personal knowledge also intro-
duces into -the record evidence which is necessary if other experts
are to testify who do not have personal knowledge but are called
to give the benefit of their learning when asked their opinions
through hypothetical questions. The Rule does not disregard the
importance of a factual foundation but simply provides more
latitude as to the time when it may be given. It eliminates quibbling
as to whether there is sufficient foundation when the expert with
personal knowledge expresses his opinion. Inasmuch as any omitted
data may be brought out upon cross-examination if considered
material there is no danger in the application of the Rule.
The part of the Rule which permits the expert to express an
opinion upon facts made known to him at the hearing opens the
door to the use of hypothetical questions as provided in Rule 58.
It permits the expert witness to give his opinion upon facts about
which he has no personal knowledge when it is desired to obtain
the benefit of his expert judgment. The use of such experts pre-
supposes that evidence of the facts upon which his opininon is based
has otherwise been introduced into the record of the trial. The Rule
does not prescribe how the facts shall be made known to the witness
at the hearing but leaves this to the discretion of the trial judge.
In the Minnesota case of Piche v. Halvorson error was claimed be-
cause a medical expert was permitted to testify upon the question
of the plaintiff's disability although he had not examined the plain-
tiff in the accident.13 The court held that a sufficient foundation was
laid by showing that he was present in court during the trial, and had
heard all of the testimony including that of another physician who
had attended the plaintiff for his injuries resulting from the acci-
dent. The court approved his testimony which was based upon an
assumption that the evidence stated and heard was true, whether
it was true was, of course, a question for the jury If some of the
facts were doubted, counsel could question their effect by use of
hypothetical questions.
The Uniform Rules do not attempt to define what may be the
13. 199 Minn. 526, 272 N. W 591 (1937).
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subject of expert testimony. They provide that if a witness is testi-
fying as an expert, he may testify within the scope of the profes-
sional knowledge, skill, experience or training which he possesses.
When expert testimony is admissible is a matter upon which the trial
court has wide discretion depending upon the aid which one with
special knowledge or experience could give to the jury.14 If the
issue involves a matter of common knowledge about which inexperi-
enced persons are capable of forming a correct judgment, there is no
need for expert opinion. There are many matters, however, about
which the triers of fact may have a general knowledge, but the
testimony of experts would still aid in their understanding of the
issues.'5 The tefndency today is to broaden the use of experts
wherever their testimony will throw greater light upon the issue in
dispute. In the recent case of Swanson v. LaFontaine an action was
brought to recover for injuries sustained in a fall resulting from the
plaintiff's efforts to avoid being struck by the hood of the defendant's
automobile which was blown off from the parked vehicle by a high
wind."0 The issue was whether the hood of the car had been securely
locked, and the plaintiff called an expert witness, a foreman of the
automobile repair shop of a dealer in cars of the same make as the
one in question, whose testimony was excluded. An offer of proof
wvas made that he would have testified that it would be impossible
for the wind to remove the hood without damaging the locking
attachment if the hood had been properly latched. The trial court
was reversed on the ground that the testimony might have aided the
jury in determining the truth of the fact issues because of the value
of the knowledge and experience of the expert as an aid to the jury
in their fact finding function. In complicated matters involving
highly scientific understanding expert testimony is necessary for a
decision upon the issues. In other cases it is a supplemental aid to
the triers of fact who might otherwise decide the case on the basis
of their own understanding.' 7 In all cases it is a matter for the triers
14. Palmer v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 191 Minn. 204,
253 N. W. 543 (1934).
15. For discussion see, Morris, The Role of Expert Test ittony is the
Trial of Negligence Issues, 26 Texas L. Rev. 1 (1947).
16. 238 Minn. 460, 57 N. W. 2d 262 (1953). The court there said, Id. at
469,57 N. W. 2d at 268, "Since the testimony would likely have aided the jury
in determining the truth of the fact issues involved here, we think that this
type of testimony was admissible." This case approved the earlier case of
Lestico v. Kuehner, 204 Min. 125,283 N. W. 122 (1938).
17 The case of Woyak v. Komeske, 237 Minm. 213, 54 N. NV. 2d 649(1952), discusses this problem extensively, and distinguishes between the
different Minnesota decisions. While some of the distinctions may be ques-
tioned, the opinion clearly shows the tendency for greater liberality upon




to accept or reject the opinion of the experts in performing their
duties in rendering a verdict.
A recent federal case, Een v. Consolidated Freightways, serves
as a warning that a proper specific objection must be urged if it is
claimed that an issue does not involve proper subject matter for
expert testimony 18 A deputy sheriff, qualified as an expert from his
experience in investigating accidents, was permitted to express his
opinion as to the point of impact upon the highway from the position
of the cars after the collision although he did not see the accident
occur. The objection urged to a question calling for this opinion
was that it was "incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial, calling for
speculation, guess, and conjecture," obviously "invading the prov-
ince of the jury," calling for a conclusion.' 9 The trial court wrote
an extensive opinion ably discussing whether the question raised
a proper issue for expert testimony 20 The appellate court avoided
this issue and affirmed the decision on the ground that the proper
objection had not been made. The court stated that there had
been no question raised as to the qualification of the witness and
that the objection urged did not state that the question propounded
was an improper subject for expert testimony While the trial court
seemed to understand what counsel had meant by the objection
urged, it was not enough to raise the question when presented on
appeal. Although the decision does seem unnecessarily technical, it
is important in pointing out that the real question is whether or not
the subject matter of the inquiry involves the kind of an issue
which is the subject for expert testimony
(3) Ruling by the Judge
Subsection (3) of Rule 56 provides that, "Unless the judge ex-
cludes the testimony he shall be deemed to have made the finding
requisite to its admission." This is important in connection with
both subsections (1) and (2) of the same rule because it eliminates
cumbersome preliminary findings and assumes that conditions are
fulfilled unless the judge excludes the testimony
(4) Opimon Evidence on Ultimate Facts
Rule 56(4) provides that, "Testimony in the form of ol)inioins
or inferences otherwise admissible under these rules is not objec-
tionable because it embraces the ultimate issue or issues to be de-
cided by the trier of the fact." This deals with a problem that has
18. 220 F 2d 82 (8th Cir. 1955).
19. Id. at 87
20. Een v. Consolidated Freightways, 120 F Supp. 289 (D. N.D. 1954)
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harrassed the courts for many years. When the expert opinion in-
volved the same issue which the jury was to decide, the objection
was commonly urged that the question invaded the province of the
jury. Therefore, to get around this objection it was customary to
ask the questions of the expert in the form of a mythical inquiry as
to what their opinion would be in an analogous situation from which
the jury could infer that it applied in the same way to the issue in
the case being tried. In a roundabout way the jury became informed
of the expert's opinion in application to the particular case. In the
leading case of Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co., the ques-
tion was presented as to whether the feeding of certain poultry food
caused the death of the plaintiff's turkeys.2 ' Counsel after narrating
hypothetically what had been done in feeding turkeys a product
known as "E Emulsion" and other relevant facts, asked the expert
witness to say in his opinion what caused the turkeys to die. The
question was objected to as calling for an ultimate fact and as in-
vading the province of the jury. The witness answered the question,
which was permitted by the court, stating that in his opinion it was
caused from the feeding of this buttermilk product. Conceivably
counsel could have asked less direct questions, but the jury needed
to know what he thought caused the turkeys to die. The jury was not
compelled to accept his opinion but was entitled to know what it
was on the only issue in the case. In an extensive opinion the
Iowa Court concluded that the trial court was right in permitting
the question and that the jury was entitled to know what the expert
thought about the issue to be decided, namely, what caused the death
of the turkeys. This ably written opinion over ruled by name sLx
Iowa decisions and innumerable other cases in which the courts
had engaged in an intellectual verbal struggle to determine what %was
and what was not an ultimate fact and indulged in imaginary reasons
why such questions could not be asked.
Minnesota at a much earlier date adopted the position of the
court in the Grzsmore case which is in direct accord with Uni-
form Rule 56(4). In Jones v. Burgess an action was brought to
recover damages for fraudulent representations claimed to have been
made by the defendant's agents in the sale of a stallion to the plain-
tiffs.2 2 The defendant contended that the horse belonged to the
alleged agent and that there was no sale from them to the plaintiff.
Error was urged in allowing the alleged agent to testify that he was
"worlong for" the defendant in selling the horse. The decision was
21. 232 Iowa 328, 5 N. W 2d 646 (1942).
22. 124 Mini. 265, 144 N. W. 954 (1914).
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affirmed and the opinion expressed the view that courts are right-
fully breaking away from the rule that excludes this type of opinion
evidence. In the case of State v. Cox there was a prosecution for
rape.23 Illicit relations were admitted and the issue involved the
question of consent. A doctor, who examined the girl a few hours
after the incident, was permitted, over the defendant's objection, to
state that in his opinion the intercourse had not been voluntary on
the part of the girl. On appeal the case was affirmed, the court stat-
ing "An expert witness who gives an opinion embracing an ultimate
fact which the jury is to determine does not invade the province of
the jury any more than an eyewitness who testifies to a decisive fact.
The modern tendency is to make no distinction between evidential
and ultimate facts subject to expert opinion. 2 4 Since in many cases
the Minnesota court has permitted opinion evidence bearing directly
upon the issue to be determined by the jury, further discussion upon
the point is unnecessary
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION. RULE 57
This Rule provides that "The judge may require that a witness
before testifying in terms of opinion or inference be first examined
concerning the data upon which the opinion or inference is founded."
It includes both lay witnesses and experts. It is an important section
because otherwise a witness is permitted to testify in terms of
opinion or inference without first stating the factual data upon which
it is based. The requirement of statement of facts before expressing
an opinion is left to the discretion of the trial judge. The judge
may require a factual statement first to be sure that the witness is
testifying about matters which he has perceived. Also the factual
evidence would disclose whether the inference was properly justi-
fied. In other words, it may have been pure mental speculation un-
related to a factual background.
In connection with this rule the dangers of overworking the
opinion objection should be considered. Sometimes when an objec-
tion to a question because it would permit testimony in terms of
opinion or inference is sustained, a new question is put calling for a
terse statement of facts which are much more damaging than the
opinion would have been. Likewise, an attorney who uses a question
calling for testimony in terms of inference should first carefully
consider whether a question calling for a purely factual answer
would not be more effective in influencing the jury Rule 57 gives
23. 172 Minn. 226, 215 N. W 189 (1927).
24. Id. at 230, 215 N. W at 191.
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the judge a discretion in determining whether factual data will be
required and is closely associated with the application of Rule 56 (1)
as it relates to lay witnesses and Rule 58 as it relates to experts.
HYPOTH.SES FOR EXPERT OPINiON NOT NECESsARY. RULE 58
There are few subjects in the law of evidence that have received
more criticism than hypothetical questions.25 There are some situa-
tions in which their use is needed. When super-experts are called
to give the benefit of their special learning upon the subject involved
although they have had no personal contact with the persons or other
matters involved in the litigation, hypothetical questions afford the
most common, and usually the only, method by which the testimony
may be presented. Facts proved by other testimony may be open
to diverse opinions among those learned in the science, and may
require the aid of specialists beyond those who have personally per-
ceived the facts. Unless the super-expert had, or is given, the
opportunity to make personal observations, the only method of
eliciting his opinion is to assume the facts hypothetically and ask his
opinion in respect to them. Also, where there is a dispute as to the
basic facts, hypothetical questions may be asked presenting both
aspects of the disputed facts for separate opinions based upon the
assumption that either statement of the facts may be true. The triers
of fact would then know the expert's opinion regardless of which
assumed factual situation they resolved to be true. Often the expert
who had perceived and narrated the facts is examined hypothetically
so as to express his opinion upon their different aspects to show their
relative significance. The use of hypothetical questions provides a
logical and natural procedure through which scientific inquiry may
be made. The Uniform Rules do not abolish them, but rather leave
to the judge the discretion of determining when they should be re-
required. Otherwise counsel are at liberty to use them in their own
discretion. The Rule presupposes that most questions will not be
in hypothetical form when directed to the expert but recognizes
their propriety and in fact their necessity in some situations.
The recent developments pertaining to demonstrative evidence
are sure to have a significant effect in eliminating excessive use of
25. Dean Wigmore-states that "Its abuses have become so obstructive
and nauseous that no remedy short of extirpation vill suffice. It is a logical
necessity, but a practical incubus; and logic must here be sacrificed." 2 Wig-
more, Evidence § 686 at 812 (3d ed. 1940). See also McCormick, Some
Observations upon the Opinon Rule and Expert Testimony, 23 Texas L Rev.
109, 128-30 (1945); Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 414, 425-27
(1952). For further discussion of this Rule see companion articles by DeParcq
at p. 332, and Geer and Adamson at 360.
1956]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEWo0
hypothetical questions and also in enabling the expert to present
his scientific knowledge in a much more understandable form. By
the use of models, diagrams, X-rays, photographs and experiments,
the expert is able to explain in an understandable way conclusions
which when expressed by words alone are very difficult to compre-
hend. The expert in the same manner may show the different possi-
bilities arising under disputed evidence of basic facts by pointing out
on the exhibit factors which would call for different conclusions.
Demonstrative evidence like all other evidence may be subject to
abuse, but their greater use in a proper way provides one of the
best means of creating real understanding of an expert's testimony
by the triers of fact .
2
The objections to hypothetical questions are well illustrated in a
California case 27 cited by Dean McCormick in his very ably written
article upon opinion testimony 28 This case involved one hypothetical
question which extended over 83 pages of the reporter's transcript
followed by an objection covering 14 pages. Lengthy hypothetical
questions often prepared in advance of trial, are surely difficult for
attorneys to formulate, for experts to comprehend and for the jury
to understand. 29
Uniform Rule 58 provides, "Questions calling for the opinion of
an expert witness need not be hypothetical in form unless the judge
in his discretion so requires, but the witness may state his opinion
and reasons therefor without first specifying data on which it is
based as an hypothesis or otherwise, but upon cross examination he
26. Ladd, Demonstrative Evidence and Expert Opinion, 1956 Wash.
U. L. Q. 1.
27 Treadwell v. Nickel, 194 Cal. 243, 228 Pac. 25 (1924).
28. McCormck, Some Observations upon the Opinion Rule and Ex
pert Testimony, 23 Texas L. Rev. 109 (1945).
29. See Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 414, 427 (1952),
"With lengthy questions often written m advance and read to the super-expert,
the witness must have a super understanding as well as superior knowledge
if he is to comprehend in one mental operation the entirety of what has been
asked so as to give any answer. What the jury thinks is hard to tell. If their
previous experience in the trial has not left them in a state of awe and be-
wilderment, the long hypothetical question will do so. Surely more direct
simple questioning is preferable. The breakup of the long question into several
shorter questions could remedy this. It is not required that every hypothesis
be included within each question. If counsel avoid overstatement and ask ques-
tions containing a fair and dispassionate hypothetical presentation of the evi-
dence relied upon as sustaining their theory of the proof, the hypothetical
question can better perform its intended function. There is at least some value
in hypothetical questions. If not, the last two and a half centuries of trials in
which this type of expert testimony is used have been wasted effort accomplish-
ing no more than to demonstrate legalistic skills of the clever and the learned
of the legal profession. Some may feel this is the case. Surely there is room
for improvement and there ought to be the same urge in this direction that




may be required -to specify such data." It does not seek to eliminate
the hypothetical question but leaves its use to determination by
counsel in the case unless the court in its discretion in an appropriate
situation would require the matter to be presented hypothetically.
Furthermore the Rule does not attempt to designate the length or
the manner in which hypothetical questions may be asked. There
are a multitude of decisions by the Minnesota court on this subject.
Some of them seem to require too much in that all facts must be
included within the hypothetical question.30 If some facts are
omitted, the cross examiner can easily show through his own hypo-
thetical questions the effect of additional or omitted facts. A series of
shorter hypothetical questions is believed far superior to an attempt
to make a single question all inclusive. Questions making hypothetical
assumptions which find no support in the evidence are of course
objectionable as being outside of the record.
The Uniform Rule assumes that a great amount of expert testi-
mony will be introduced without the use of hypothetical questions.
No artful or refined language is required of the expert. He may give
a firm opinion if such represents his belief without coupling it with
a statement of the various conceivable possibilities which often de-
stroy the effect of his real convictions. The Minnesota court in a
leading case, Donnelly v. St. Paul City Ry., at a fairly early date
refused to recognize the fine distinction sometimes sought to be drawn
between asking an expert whether certain causes might produce cer-
tain results, and asking him whether in his opinion they did produce
such results.31 In this case involving a personal injury, the court
permitted the witness to be asked the question "What would you
say in your opinion, was the cause of her condition?" This involved
not only a question upon an ultimate fact but permitted a frank
opinion in a firm form which the jury could accept or not, depend-
ing upon their own determination. Rule 58 upon hypothetical ques-
tions should be well received by the Minnesota Bar as it represents
the modem view today and states in a very concise form concepts in
accord with the trend of judicial decisions in the state.'2
30. A hypothetical question need not contain any particular number
of facts. Independent School Dist No. 35 v. A. Hedenberg and Co., 214 Minn.
82, 7 N. W. 2d 511 (1943). While the Minnesota court has regarded it to be
error to ask hypothetical questions which are not all inclusive in the state-
ment of facts, they have frequently held such error insufficient to justify
reversal. Lee v. Minneapolis Street Ry., 230 Minn. 315, 41 N. NV. 2d 433(1950) ; Roberts v. DeKalb Agricultural Ass'n, 229 Minn. 188, 38 N. NV. 2d
189 (1949).
31. 70 Minn. 278, 73 N. W 157 (1897). See also Piche v. Halvorson,
199 Minn. 526, 272 N. W 591 (1937).
32. 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 686 (3d ed. 1940).
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APPOINTMENT OF EXPERTS. RULE 59
The Rule provides, "If the judge determines that the appoint-
ment of expert witnesses in an action may be desirable, he shall
order the parties to show cause why expert witnesses should not be
appointed, and after opportunity for hearing may request nomina-
tions and appoint one or more such witnesses. If the parties agree in
the selection of an expert or experts, only those agreed upon shall
be appointed. Otherwise the judge may make his own selection. An
expert witness shall not be appointed unless he consents to act.
The judge shall determine the duties of the witness and inform him
thereof at a conference in which the parties shall have an oppor-
tunity to participate. A witness so appointed shall advise the parties
of his findings, if any, and may thereafter be called to testify by the
judge or any party He may be examined and cross-examined by
each party This rule shall not limit the parties in calling expert
witnesses of their own selection and at their own expense."
This is a completely new rule and would change the law of
Minnesota.33 In fact it would change the law of most if not all states.
It goes to the very heart of the problems and the abuses in expert
testimony It has the support of the learned Dean Wigmore and is
in substance the same as provided in the Uniform Expert Testimony
Act of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws in 1937 That act was approved by a committee of the
American Bar Association on Improvement of the Law of Evidence
in 1938. In a more elaborate statement it was included in Chapter
V of the American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence. The
Uniform Rule is quite similar to Rule 28 of the new Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure.8
4
Rule 59 does not need much explanation but further comments
will be made to emphasize its features. It does not require the ap-
pointment of expert witnesses by the court in all cases. As indicated
under Rule 58 this rule does not eliminate the use of hypothetical
questions or the ordinary examination of expert witnesses with
which the Bar is familiar, but rather provides an additional method
of presenting expert testimony The rule provides that appoint-
ment of experts by the court shall be made only in actions where the
judge regards it to be desirable. In many cases where expert testi-
mony is used the rule in all probability would not be employed.
33. For further discussion of this rule see companion articles by DeParcq
at 334, and Geer and Adamson at 360.
34. Federal Rule cited infra note 37
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However, in the sanity cases and on many other medical matters,
as well as in the cases generally involving opinion upon complicated
issues where the facts themselves are known only through scientific
investigation, this provision should be a real service to the bench
and bar. It should cause greater respect by the public for the judicial
system and eliminate the distrust created by the battle of partisan
experts. The greatest aid would be to the jury who would have the
benefit 'of carefully thought out non-partisan testimony in a form
which they could understand since the opinion would be based upon
personal perception. It is fair to the litigants who may agree in the
selection of the experts since in the event of agreement only those
agreed upon shall be appointed. Otherwise the judge may make his
own selection with the benefit of nominations by the parties. No
expert is compelled to serve without his consent. The judge shall
inform the experts of their duties at a conference in which the par-
ties have an opportunity to participate, and the parties shall be
advised of the findings. Thus this rule is consistent with the present
trend today toward pre-trial examination and discovery before trial.
The value of the rule to the experts is its consistency with
scientific determinations of matters regularly made by scientists
in considering similar problems not involved in litigation. It would
permit clinical examination, for example, in case of persons whose
sanity is involved in litigation. It would give the expert the oppor-
tunity to make mental tests and to study the person in question
over a period of time in order to observe the existence of conditions
and conduct so important in formulating an opinion. The appointed
expert always would have the opportunity of personal perception
and knowledge about the data upon which their opinions would be
based. There would be no obligation felt by them to satisfy the
desires of the parties because they would be witnesses of the court.
The rule gets away from the fear that the court would always
appoint the same experts regularly who might not be satisfactory,
because the parties can agree upon the experts they want or suggest
nominations if they cannot agree. The Uniform Rules do not go
into the more elaborate provisions of the Model Code of Evidence
in respect to the mechanics providing an opportunity to the ap-
pointee for perception and examination as these matters are left to
the implied powers of the judge when he instructs the experts upon
their duties. Rule 59 is a simple, short statement of a method of
obtaining and using expert testimony which should commend itself
to anyone who is really concerned with a just decision in court trials.
19561
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COMPENSATION OF EXPERT WITNESSES. RULE 60
This Uniform Rule is broader than the present Minnesota
statute but is similar in that it gives the judge the discretion to fix
amount of the fee which will be charged as costs rather than fix
some arbitrary fee applicable to all cases. Uniform Rule 60 provides
that, "Expert witnesses appointed by the judge shall be entitled
to reasonable compensation in such sum only as the judge may
allow. Except as may be otherwise provided by statute of this state
applicable to a specific situation, the compensation shall be paid (a)
in a criminal action by the (county) in the first instance under order
of the judge and charged as costs in the case, and (b) in a civil
action by the opposing parties in equal portions to the clerk of the
court at such tune as the judge shall direct, and charged as costs
in the case. The amount of compensation paid to an expert witness
not appointed by the judge shall be a proper subject of inquiry as
relevant to his credibility and the weight of his testimony" In crimi-
nal trials it makes the county or other designated unit of government
responsible for costs of experts. This seems better for state use
than Rule 28 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which
provides for payment out of such funds as may be provided by law,
because there may not be any provision otherwise provided by law
for such payment. If, however, the Uniform Rules are adopted by
the supreme court through its rule making power rather than by
legislative enactment, it would be better to have legislation providing
for payment because of doubt as to the authority of the court to
create a financial obligation upon the county The apportionment of
cost of experts when appointed by the court appears to be a neces-
sary part of the rule. It also provides that the fee thus determined
shall be charged as cost in the case.
The last sentence of this rule permits inquiry as to the amount
of compensation paid to an expert not appointed by the judge as an
element to consider in determining the credibility of the expert and
the weight to be given to his testimony This is within the general
rule that interest or biasof a witness may be shown to test credi-
bility Recently the Pennsylvania court in the case of Reed v. Phila-
delphia Transportation Co. had this problem before it as the key
issue on appeal and reversed the trial court from refusing to permit
adverse counsel to cross-examine in respect to the fees which a medi-
cal expert was to be, or had been, paid. 5 This is the leading case upon
the subject and the court in conclusion stated, "The amount of an
expert's fees, whether stipulated in advance of a trial or determinable
35. 171 Pa. Super 60, 65, 90 A. 2d 371, 373 (1952). The Grutski case,
Grutski v. Kline, 352 Pa. 401, 43 A. 2d 152 (1945), is criticized by the court.
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in the future, has a direct and vital bearing upon his credibility, his
interest, bias, or partisanship, and the rule of the Grutski and cog-
nate cases should be liberally applied. The ruling of the court con-
stituted reversible error." 86
The most significant contribution of Rule 60 is believed to be the
provision for reasonable competition of experts. It will surely be an
improvement in .many states in which the amount fixed in the
statutes is so small that it cannot be actually regarded as compensa-
tion at all. It should help eliminate some of the resistance of medical
experts to appear in court trials.
CREDIBILITY OF APPOINTED EXPERT WITNESS. RULE 61
This Rule is significant and is the reverse of the position taken
in the last sentence of the preceding rule. It provides that, "The
fact of the appointment of an expert witness by the judge may be
revealed to the trier of the facts as relevant to the credibility of such
witness and the weight of his testimony." The fact that the expert
witness or witnesses are appointed by the court without direct re-
sponsibility to either party is designed to obtain an impartial con-
sideration and opinion upon the facts in issue. This will give weight
to the testimony of court appointed experts. Either or both parties
may call experts of their own selection when they question the
correctness of the conclusions of the appointed experts. There is
surely nothing objectionable about having the jury know the
whole situation if it is to have the best opportunity possible to re-
solve the dispute. If one or both of the parties call other experts
they will have full opportunity to present their observations and
opinions, and any new light upon the issue may be considered and
compared with the testimony of the court appointed experts in an
effort to arrive at a just solution of the controversy.
CONCLUSION
An effort has not been made to comment upon and cite all
of the cases on opinion and expert testimony in comparing the
Minnesota law and the Uniform Rules. This would serve little
purpose and only selected cases representing generally the position
of Minnesota law have been used. From the study it appears that
Minnesota would not have nearly as long a way to go as many states
in adopting the Rules. Development of the law in this state has been
on the whole forward-looking with many supreme court decisions
establishing the best of modern thought upon evidence. Testimony




and disagreement in some states seems not to be a problem in Min-
nesota. It appears that there has been less flexibility in the method
of using hypothetical questions than in some states but even upon
this subject there has never been the demand that questions be put
hypothetically or upon some imaginary premise as appears to be
a requirement in some jurisdictions. The trend seems to be the
same as elsewhere in the enlargement of issues upon which expert
testimony may be used. This is certain to gain momentum as reliable
expert knowledge and experience makes available more types of
expert testimony to assist the triers of fact with matters upon which
there is a common knowledge by people generally Also the use of
photographs, models, graphs, charts and other demonstrative ex-
hibits are commonly employed in Minnesota as a means by which
experts may better communicate to the triers of fact the application
and validity of their technical knowledge. The provisions for ap-
pointment of experts by the court would be new to Minnesota, but
the carefully drawn Rules ought to appeal to the Bench and the Bar
of the state. ;Fhrough some of the many Lawyer's Institutes held
here, the value of this provision could be considered to inform the
profession of its benefits. It should be emphasized that court ap-
pointed experts would be used only if those cases where the kind of
issues and the type of expert testimony contemplated are so demand-
ing as to render this procedure desirable. The provision differs from
the new Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in that if the parties
agree upon the selection of the experts the court must use those
whom they have chosen. 37 The simplicity and conciseness of the
Rules are very appealing and should result in early recognition of
their value. Any proposal that is new meets the normal resistence to
any kind of a change. If the study of the Rules does no more than
cause a review by the Bar of the law of evidence as it is and what it
might be, it will have served a most useful purpose. It is hoped that
their study will accomplish even more and that careful examination
of the Uniform Rules will result in their adoption.
37 Rule 28 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, "The
court may order the defendant or the government or both to show cause
why expert witnesses should not be appointed, and may request the parties
to submit nominations. The court may appoint any expert witnesses
agreed upon by the parties, and may appoint witnesses of its own selection.
An expert witness shall not be appointed by the court unless he consents to
act. A witness so appointed shall be informed of his duties by the court at a
conference in which the parties shall have opportunity to participate. A wit-
ness so appointed shall advice the parties of his findings, if any, and mat there-
after be called to testify by the court or by any party. He shall be su ject to
cross-examination by each party. The court may determine the reasonable
compensation of such a witness and direct its payment out of such funds as
may be provided by law. The parties also may call expert witnesses of their
own selection."
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